Capital requirements appear to augment the buffer protecting the banking system and the FDIC. However, regulating levels of bank capital also may increase banks' risk-taking and hamper their ability to compete with nonbanking organizations
The Depression of the 1930s is often attributed to the failure of the banking system, and many economists believe that another such failure could have equally serious consequences. 1 Beyond its obvious concern over such a banking debacle, the government also worries about the failure of individual banks, because a large institution's collapse could endanger the entire system. Furthermore, the failure of individual banks imposes losses on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), whose ultimate guarantor is the United States government. Among other means, the government tries to limit the risk of bank failures and the magnitude of the FDIC's losses by regulating banking organizations' equity capital. Equity capital, which includes both the owners' investment and the bank's retained earnings, assists a bank in several important ways: during lean times it provides a cushion to absorb losses and ward off insolvency; it protects against illiquidity resulting from deposit runs by helping to maintain depositor confidence; 2 and, should a bank fail, equity capital also reduces the losses the FDIC must bear.
In spite of government regulation, bank capital ratios have fallen dramatically in this century.
The ratio of bank equity capital to total assets dropped from 20 percent in 1900 to approximately 7 percent in 1983. Equity to risk assets have fallen even more sharply, from a peak of over 25 percent in the mid-1940s to under 10 percent in recent years. 3 In December 1981 federal regulators renewed their emphasis on bank capital ratios by issuing numerical capital adequacy guidelines that required many institutions to increase their equity capital significantly. Congress demonstrated its support for the regulatory actions by specifying in the International Lending and Supervision Act of 1983 that each "appropriate Federal Banking Agency shall cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital." Two years later regulators revised the capital guidelines, imposing a single standard on all banks regardless of size and primary regulator.
The purpose of this study is to review the arguments for and against regulating the equity capital of independent banks and bank holding companies. 4 The current regulatory standards use two definitions of capital: primary capital (the sum of permanent equity capital plus an allowance for possible loan losses and mandatory convertible securities, minus certain intangible assets), and total capital (primary capital plus limited life preferred stock and subordinated debt)- 5 Each of the non-equity elements of primary and total capital raises a unique set of issues. For example, equity capital holders (stockholders) can be forced to share in losses without a bank's failing, but subordinated debt holders do not have to share in losses unless the firm is bankrupt. 6 This study begins with discussion of how capital may protect the banking system and the FDIC. It proceeds to review four arguments against capital regulation: such regulation historically has proven ineffective; it will not significantly reduce the riskiness of the banking system; capital regulation carries considerable disadvantages; and other alternatives exist.
Why Regulate Capital?
In a market economy like that of the United States, the presumption is that free-market competition should control individual private sector decisions, except where the market fails to consider important social costs, social benefits, or both. The case for government regulation of capital rests on two such failures: the market does not properly price the effect of bank failure on the stability of the banking system, nor the costs of bank failure to the FDIC.
In the absence of binding government regulation, banks would base capital decisions solely on their competition for customers, investors (in debt and equity), and suppliers (including labor and management). To succeed in this arena, banks must offer potential customers, investors, and suppliers a better deal than other organizations. Banks' capital policies can affect their competitive position; for example, their ability to attract credit and superior management may be enhanced by higher capital ratios, for the additional capital may reduce the riskof failure. The institutions' attraction for equity investors may be reduced by higher capital ratios, however, because more capital can imply a lower return on equity. In theoretical studies of capital ratios, the most simplistic models maintain that the competing demands of creditors and stockholders exactly offset each other, and banks (like other firms) have no optimal capital ratio. 7 A bank's capital ratio is important, however, in more general models that include taxes, the costs of financial distress, and agency costs. 8 An additional influence on bank capital ratios is the short maturity structure of liabilities. The banking industry differs from almost all other industries in that it issues liabilities that are redeemable on demand, which makes banks more vulnerable to a sudden loss of their creditors' confidence. If creditors of a nonbankingfirm lose confidence in its stability, they can do nothing until their debt matures. If depositors begin to doubt the financial condition of their bank, however, they can withdraw demand deposits FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA immediately, without even taking time to determine the institution's actual condition. Sudden deposit runs can be deadly, even to financially strong banks, because most institutions invest part of their demand deposits in illiquid loans. Few banks can liquidate their loan portfolios on short notice without suffering substantial losses. 9 Capital can reduce the risk of a run on a bank by strengthening customer confidence in the institution's viability. 10 Without regulation, banks would increase their capital to reduce exposure to deposit runs. The increase would be less than is socially desirable, however, because the benefits to society from a safer banking system play no role in banks' capital decisions. Competitive pressures reflect only private gains to investors and suppliers.
The failure to consider benefits to society is especially important given that the demise of one bank can undermine the confidence of depositors at other banks. This is particularly troubling when a large bank fails (see box). Once a run starts spreading from bank to bank, the suspicion of instability can become a self-fulfilling prophecy with the potential to rock the banking system. Thus, one reason for regulating capital is to improve the banking system's stability by reducing the risk of individual bank failures.
A second argument for regulating capital is that government actions designed to protect banks already interfere with the competitive process that otherwise would determine bank capital. The government lessens the risk of bank runs through deposit insurance from the FDIC and access to the Federal Reseive's discount window. An unintended side effect of lowering depositor risk is that insurance also reduces depositors' insistence on adequate bank capital. According* to several studies, banks respond by lowering their capital ratios, which in turn exposes the FDIC to greater potential losses. 11
WHEN LARGE BANKS FAIL
Capital regulation seeks to prevent a collapse of the banking system by reducing the risk of failure of individual banks One policy question in developing capital guidelines is whether the failure of individual banks is undesirable for the banking system. If individual bankfailures are unimportant, then capital guidelines need only prevent the banking system from foundering. If the failure of a small number of banks can cause a systemic problem, however, perhaps the guidelines should be sufficiently stringent to prevent individual banks from failing.
Individual failures become especially significant in the case of large banks. Thomas Mayer(1975) cites four reasons why the demise of a large institution could create runs on the banking system. First, large bank failures receive considerable media attention, while small bank failures may go virtually unnoticed by depositors at other banks 31 Second, the failure of a large bank probably provides an indication of the asset quality at sizable institutions Because many small bank failures are due to dishonest or incompetent management or local economic conditions depositors at other banks may justly conclude that their bank does not suffer from these burdens Large banks that fail, however, probably have major problems in their loan portfolios Other depositors may reason that if one large bank failed because of problem loans their bank also could experience difficulties since most large banks invest in the same types of loans 32 Third, large banks have substantially more nondeposit liabilities (many with relatively short maturities) which are not guaranteed protection by the FDIC. Fourth, large banks have more deposits that exceed the coverage guaranteed by the FDIC.
These two reasons for regulating bank capital partly offset each other. Increased government protection of banks implies a reduced danger of bank runs. For example, 100 percent insurance would virtually eliminate the risk of runs but would saddle the government with more of the risk of failure. The current insurance system contains elements of risk for the government and depositors alike. The government bears risk because it guarantees insurance up to the first $100,000 per depositor and generally absorbs additional losses. Yet some depositors also are vulnerable because the FDIC guarantees deposit insurance only on the first $100,000 per depositor per bank. The agency has provided protection to larger deposits, but only on a case-bycase basis. Under the current system, large depositors who do not remove their funds from a failing bank quickly enough risk losing part of their deposits.
Influencing Bank Capital
For capital regulations to reduce.the risk of bank failure and FDIC losses, the regulations must have some influence over bank behavior. An important question is whether the regulators or the markets are dominant in determining capital ratios. Indications that market influence is strong and regulatory influence weak have been found by studies in three separate areas: market willingness to supply capital, market control of bank risk-taking, and regulatory effectiveness in enforcing capital adequacy controls.
Ronald D. Watson (1975) and James C. Ehlen, J r. (1983) emphasize the markets role in allocating capital. Watson argues that banks' problems in raising capital are not due to "a shortage of capital but an unwillingness or inability to pay the 'going rate'" (emphasis in original). Ehlen notes that large banks' profitability between 1964 and 1974 was too low to support asset growth, and so their equity capital ratios dropped. Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr. (1981) and Adrian W. Throop (1975) both claim empirical support for the market's primacy in allocating capital. They hypothesize that capital inflows into an industry are directly related to its profitability and that investors are willing to invest more in industries with high earnings. Both studies find that changes in bank capital are closely related to earnings. Dwyer's and Throop's studies may overstate the market's role, however, since most increases in bank capital result from retained earnings. 12 Thus, their results may show only that banks retain more income when they have more to retain.
The evidence on the market's role in controlling bank risk, including capital adequacy, is mixed. On the basis of his personal experience as a consultant in this area David C. Cates (1985a) claims that creditors are monitoring and disciplining high-risk banking organizations. In surveying the literature on market discipline, Robert A. Eisenbeis and Gary G. Gilbert (1985) find evidence that the markets react to differential risk exposure in the pricing of debt and equity issues. One limitation of that body of literature is that it looks only at the market's evaluation of banks with assets in excessof $1 billion. Another limitation is that relatively little research has focused on whether market forces are strong enough to influence bank behavior. That is, even if the market charges higher premiums to riskier banks, those premiums may be too small to affect bank operations.
Evidence prior to imposition of the December 1981 regulatory guidelines suggests that the regulators were ineffective but later evidence implies the guidelines are influencing banking organizations. Sam Peltzman (1970) , John H. Mingo (1975) , and J. Kimball Dietrich and Christopher James (1983) use similar models to test the regulators' effectiveness in controlling bank capital during the 1960s and early 1970s. Using aggregate bank data from 1963 to 1965, Peltzman suggests that regulators have been ineffective; Mingo, using a sample of 323 banks in 1970, concludes that regulators influence capital. Dietrich and James contend that Mingo confuses supervisory influence with market influences. Their results, based on the actions of more than 10,000 banks during the 1971 to 1974 period, support their argument that no supervisory influence exists. Alan J. Marcus (1983) , who examines a sample of large bank holding companies over a 20-year period ending in 1977, contends that the supervisors evaluated a bank's capital relative to capital levels of its peers and that no absolute standards existed.
1 Larry D. Wall and David R. Peterson (1985) . Their study develops two separate models of the determination of bank holding company capital: one is relevant if the process is dominated by the regulatory guidelines, and the other if dominated by the financial markets. They estimate both models using a procedure that assigns each bank a probability of corning from the regulatory regime. From their finding that approximately 90 percent of the institutions are classified in the regulatory regime, the authors conclude that the regulatory guidelines dominate bank capital planning.
Thus, while available evidence suggests that the market may have significantly affected bank capital ratios at one time, one empirical study conducted since the guidelines were adopted indicates that the regulators are currently the dominant influence.
Capital Regulations and Bank Risk
Banks are subject to the risks of insolvency (which occurs when the value of liabilities exceeds the value of assets) and illiquidity (an inability to repay creditors on a timely basis). Increased capital can protect banks from insolvency by providing a cushion to absorb losses; it can shield banks from illiquidity by reinforcing depositors' confidence in their institutions. Indeed, if a bank's capital equals the sum of its risky assets plus its contingent liabilities, only fraud can cause it to fail. However, since banks must compete with other firms for capital, there are limits on the amount of new capital they can raise. Most proposals for increasing banks' equity capital focus on raising the equity capital to assets ratios somewhere between a fraction of a percentage point and a few percentage points.' Would an increase of a few percentage points or less significantly reduce banks' risks of insolvency and illiquidity?
Capital's Effect on Insolvency Risk. Some argue against capital regulation on the grounds that management is far more important to bank solvency than is capital. They maintain that no amount of capital can prevent the failure of a mismanaged bank, and that a strong, well-managed bank can operate with little capital.
Empirical evidence that increased bank capital >-.; will not significantly reduce banks' risk of failure comes from Anthony M. . Using historical data on the volatility of changes in banks' capital, they estimate the risk that a sample of banks would exhaust their capital base. The evidence from their 1965 to 1974 sample period suggests that the probability of bank failure was small and that reasonable variations in the capital level would ¿. not have an economically significant effect on the risk of failure. 13 Additional support for this hypothesis can be found in some reviews of bank failures. Cates Con-A^. suiting Analysts, Inc. (1985) , examining bank failures in 1984, concludes that capital risk was nota "significant factor in failure." The study notes that r failed banks typically had lower capital ratios than their peers but points out that 70 percent of the failed banks had book capital ratios in 1982 that exceed the 1985 guidelines by 35 basis points or more. George Vojta (1973) concludes: "The weight of scholarly research is overwhelming to the effect that the level of bank capital has not been a material factor in preventing bank in-T solvency, and that ratio tests for capital adequacy have not been useful in assessing or predicting the capability of a bank to remain solvent."
On the other hand, James G. Ehlen, Jr. (1983) suggests that capital "plays a critical, although passive role, in maintaining the financial strength and credibility of a financial institution in the < marketplace, a vital role for any institution that must rely on continuing access to funds from a wide variety of sources." While acknowledging that earnings are more important than capital, he remarks that a relatively high return on assets is usually associated with a relatively well-capitalized bank. He also points out that adversity suggests some sort of earnings problems, and that, to the extent earning power is reduced, the focus necessarily shifts to capital. ",
A study by Leon Korobow and David P. Stuhr (1983) . Hanweck (1984) , and Eugenie D. Short, Gerald P. O 'Driscoll, Jr., and Franklin D. Berger (1985) all show a statistically significant relationship between a bank's capital ratio and its probability of failure. Recent studies thus indicate that higher levels of capital are associated with a bank's chance of eluding failure. If a bank's losses are sufficiently great, then nothing short of 100 percent capital can prevent failure. But in many cases, greater capital can provide the time necessary fora bank to solve its problems. Empirical evidence suggests that observed variations in existing bank capital structures can have a statistically significant effect on institutions' probability of failure.
Responding to Capital Regulation. The finding that increased capital reduces a bank's risk of failure does not necessarily imply that regulatory mandated increases will reduce this risk. Augmenting capital reduces the risk of failure only if other factors, such as the riskiness of bank assets, are held constant. The same market forces that led banks to shrink their capital ratios prior to regulatory pressure could lead banks to assume other types of risk in response to capital regulation.
Banks can raise their capital ratios but leave their operations otherwise unchanged, accepting a reduced return as the cost of lower risk. The risk aversion of some closely held banks with undiversified portfolios may be such that the difference between the original risk/return relationship and that after capital standards are imposed barely affects management.
Some banks may be forced to innovate in response to capital regulation, however, if their stockholders are unwilling to accept the lower returns accompanying reduced risk. For instance, a bank can try to raise returns by passing the capital regulation costs on to customers. This maneuver will slow a bank's growth to the extent that consumer demand for its products responds to price: the more responsive the demand, the greater the loss. Demand is likely to be most responsive where banks face significant competition from other banks and from nonbank providers. Spared the banks' increased costs, nonbank providers may decline to go along with a price increase. Banks may have more success raising prices on services when contending only with other banks, which also have been forced by regulation to increase their capital. In this case, all banks may choose to raise their prices.
Banks also could increase their income by finding new sources that will not trigger regulatory demands for increased capital. Edward J. Kane (1977) suggests this possibility in his"regulatory dialectic theory," which states that imposing regulation limits banks' ability to serve their customers, and creates opportunities for profitable innovations that circumvent the regulation while meeting its formal requirements. 14 Regulators often respond to such innovations, but generally not until they identify the innovations' various effects. Following this delay, banks resume the process of identifying and exploiting loopholes.
Accepting more risks is an innovation that can raise bank earnings without requiring additional capital under the current guidelines. Increased risk can involve substituting assets with high risk and return for low-risk, low-return assets. 15 Additionally, increased risk can take the form of receiving fee income for risks that are assumed but not placed on the balance sheet, such as writing stand-by letters of credit. Banks that enhance their income in this fashion can maintain their prior return on equity and restore the value of the FDIC subsidy to its original value. Koehn and Santomero (1980) note that the banks with the weakest capital adequacy (in the sense of capital per unit of risk) are those most likely to respond to higher capital standards by investing in more risky assets. This suggests that imposing binding regulations on all banks would increase rather than decrease the dispersion of bank risk exposure. A further implication is that capital regulations targeted at high-risk banks may be ineffective in reducingtheir riskof failure.
All the studies suggesting that banks will take more risks in the face of capital regulation are limited in two ways. First, they assume the capital standards are set independently of the particular bank's risk exposure. Risk-based capital standards (discussed in the accompanying box) may discourage banks from offsetting greater capital with riskier assets. Second, the empirical underpinning for the hypothesis is meager. Anecdotal evidence suggests banks are reducing their lower FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF CAPITAL REGULATION
Studies showing that regulatory mandated increases in equity capital can lead banks to higher risk assume that the standards are risk-independent; that is, that regulators require both risky and safe banks to meet the same capital standards Perhaps the standards would be more effective if they called for risky banks to maintain higher capital levels Such variable capital guidelines could be based on preannounced standards or on the discretion of each bank's supervisor.
Measures Incorporating Risk
Regulators can impose variable capital guidelines based on ex ante, or forward-looking, measures of banks' risk exposure. Such measures would examine the risk that a bank could suffer significant losses in the future and would require institutions subject to greater risk to hold more capital. Ex ante measures could be based on the regulators' evaluation of the riskiness of a bank's balance sheet (and possibly its off-balance activities) or they could be derived from financial market pricing of bank securities By contrast if ex post measures were used, the regulators would base their current capital requirements for individual banks on the results of recent operations Banks with a history of greater losses and weaker earnings would be required to hold more capital.
Measures Distinct from Financial Market Measures. U.S. bank regulators have used variable capital guidelines based on ex ante risk measure before. Shortly after World War II, regulators gauged capital adequacy on the basis of capital to risk assets, with risk assets defined as total assets less cash and U.S. government securities In the 1950s the New York Federal Reserve Bank developed a risk-based system that divided assets into six categories, each assigned a specific percentage of required capital. Later in that decade the staff of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors developed a"Form for Analyzing Bank Capital" (ABC formula) that was used to help identify undercapitalized banks The Board's formula was based on both the liquidation values that could be obtained for a bank's assets and on its liquidity. 33 An advantage of using ex ante risk measures is that they provide for a larger capital cushion before a bank begins to experience problems Thus some high-risk banks that might otherwise be forced to close during difficult times would have the extra capital needed to survive. A further advantage is that such guidelines limit banks' ability to offset the effects of capital regulation by increasing their risk exposure. Under an ideal system, any benefit a bank obtained by raising its risks would be balanced fully by higher capital requirements.
A potential disadvantage of ex ante measures is that weighing risk can be subject to significant error. Banks could find themselves with artificial incentives to engage in some activities and artificial disincentives to engage in others-a similar drawback to risk-independent capital guidelines The major difference is that capital guidelines based on ex ante risk may encourage banks to seek out new ventures that have not been properly rated under the guidelines In ferreting out opportunities whose dangers are underestimated by the regulators, banks may shoulder more risks than they intended.
Ex ante risk measures have been developed through "early warning studies" research whose purpose was to provide regulators with a system to signal future bank failures 34 The relationship between capital adequacy and bank failure is more rigorously examined by Sherman J. Maisel (1981) , who reviews capital adequacy and the risks that can cause insolvency. 35 Eli Talmoi's (1980) work provides a complete theoretical model for determining the optimal capital standard. Using an ex ante risk measure Talmor's model allows banks to fail due to insolvency or illiquidity.
Market Data. Bank regulators could rely on the financial markets for estimates of bank risk rather than attempting to calculate it themselves The financial markets already evaluate the riskiness of bank certificates of deposit, subordinated debt stock and stock options If the markets' risk premiums could be determined, these would provide an independent evaluation of a bank's risk Use of market risk premiums would necessarily be limited to banking organizations with publicly traded securities The number of such organizations is relatively small, but they control a majority of the banking system's assets Perhaps the most significant objection to relying on market-based rather than regulator-determined measures is that the regulators possess better-or at least different-information than the markets The regulators can examine individual bank assets and internal documents Yet this advantage is countered by two advantages of the market First the market can make use of all the information it has available, while the regulators face political constraints.
Second, the number of market participants far exceeds the number of regulators If an investor errs, he can at most have only a minuscule effect on the price of a bank security. If a regulator makes a mistake, it can be corrected by a bank only through a costly appeal to Congress or the courts Furthermore, Jack Guttentag and Richard Herring (1984) point out that market participants who make systematic mistakes in evaluating what they call "project-specific" risk eventually will be driven out of business 36 A variant of the ex ante risk measure that relies on the market for bank stocks comes from George E. Morgan (1984) . Morgan states that a bank's risk should be measured by its stock's Beta coefficient from the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). His results suggest that optimal regulation could lead to the regulators' requiring all banking organizations to have the same Beta A potentially significant problem with Morgan's approach to capital regulation is the weakness in available models of stock returns The CAPM has been questioned on several points including its assertion that all stock market returns can be explained by a single factor. An alternative model of stock returns that incorporates multiple factors is the arbitrage pricing model. Morgan notes that the capital regulation model also could be applied if the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) model of stock returns is used. Unfortunately, while APT does not suffer the same problems as the CAPM, the use of APT by the regulators is not feasible until some general agreement can be reached as to which factors belong in the model. 37 Even if the CAPM and APT models had no theoretical and empirical flaws in explaining stock returns, both measures capture only part of a banking organization's risk exposure. Morgan notes that since Beta measures only the systematic risk of a stock banks could try to increase their non-systematic risk One way to capture systematic and non-systematic risk would be to use the implied standard deviations from stock options Alan J. Marcus and Israel Shaked (1984) and J. Huston Mc-Culloch (1985) recently used this approach to estimate the value of FDIC deposit insurance Regrettably, the number of stocks with publicly traded options is far fewer than the number of publicly traded stocks and some unresolved empirical issues cloud the estimation of implied standard deviations 38 Another way is to use the risk premium on bank deposits as James B Thomson (1985) has done, to estimate the value of deposit insurance. A minor difficulty in using Beta implied standard deviations and deposit risk premiums to establish risk based capital standards is that the financial markets should recognize that short-run increases in bank risk eventually will be offset by regulatory actions Thus market measures of risk may be biased toward the regulatory standards Ex Post Risk Measures Ex post risk measures entail less measurement error than ex ante measures as the results of a bank's past risk-taking are evident in its income statement. One disadvantage is that ex post measures lag behind changes in actual risk exposure. This lag could permit one-time gains to banks that increase their holdings of high-risk high-return assets in that they would gain the additional income for a period without having to increase their capital ratios immediately. Similarly, banks that decrease their risk exposure would pay a one-time penalty because they would have to maintain the higher capital ratios until their income stream reflected the decrease. Another possible drawback is that ex post capital requirements force banks to raise capital at a time when it is likely to be most difficult. Furthermore, an ex post request for additional capital may come too late to prevent some troubled banks from failing.
An example of an ex post measure of risk is volatility of a bank's capital account, used by . Santomero (1983) points out that the empirical application of this method could be limited by the frequency with which the economic environment changes However, he claims this approach has better theoretical justification than many of the early warning studies of bank failure. Another recent study, by Terrence M. Belton (1985) , demonstrates how capital standards could be tied to one aspect of bank risk: the risk of loan losses He finds that such a risk-related standard could have reduced substantially the number of banks for which loan losses exceeded capital in 1983 and 1984.
Supervision without Numerical Guidelines
Capital supervision without preannounced standards was attempted in the period immediately preceding adoption of the current system of capital regulation. This approach theoretically allows regulators to evaluate a variety of factors in determining what constitutes adequate capital for individual banks Under numerical guidelines regulators are more likely to focus only on those factors that appear in their formula For example, the riskiness of a bank loan depends not only on the type of loan (for instance, commercial versus consumer) but also on how the process is managed. Loans that are relatively safe when made by banks with prudent competent management and sound procedures may be excessively risky when extended by banks with imprudent or incompetent management and weak procedures 39 The regulators may have more difficulty incorporating their information about a bank's management under numerical guidelines than under an informal system of capital supervision.
The obvious disadvantage of supervision without numerical guidelines is that it has proven ineffective. During the 1970s the regulators supervised bank capital without announcing quantitative standards that individual banks were expected to meet The result of this type of regulation, according to Marcus (1983) , was that regulators could prevent any bank from operating with much less capital than its peers but they were unable to prevent capital ratios from declining throughout the industry.
An inherent reason for this ineffectiveness is the difficulty regulators have defending their judgment in Congress and the courts without some objective standard. An additional reason for guidelines based on a preannounced formula is that the guidelines aid banks in planning for the future.
Summary
Various methods exist for setting regulatory standards for individual banks' capital. The standard may or may not depend on the specific banks' risk. When it does the risk measure can be calculated from current accounting information, recent market information, or historical accounting results Furthermore, regulators may choose to announce publicly their formula for determining optimal capital or they may elect to disclose the guidelines only to bank management The appropriate method for regulating capital depends on such issues as the goals of capital regulation and the workability and enforceability of the various approaches FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA Iglflf M risk, more liquid assets in response to the regulation. 16 G. D. Koppenhaver (1985) examined the off-balance sheet activities of banks in the Seventh Federal Reserve District for September 1984. (These bank commitments may entail some risk but do not require immediate creation of an asset, and thus they are not recorded on bank balance sheets. 17 ) Koppenhaver found that loan commitments, stand-by letters of credit and commercial letters of credit all are inversely related to the bank's equity capital to assets ratio. Fredricka P. Santos (1985) found that changes in multinational banks' primary capital to assets ratio had a statistically significant effect on their off-balance sheet activities (as reported on Schedule L of the Reports of Condition that banks file with federal regulators).
Capital's Effect on llliquidity Risk. If capital regulation reduces the risk of bank failure due to insolvency, it may in turn strengthen depositors' confidence in an institution, hence decreasing their incentive to participate in a bank run. However, an increase in capital of only a few percentage points can do no more than reduce the likelihood of deposit runs-it will not eliminate the risk 18 Deposit runs are always possible so long as any group of depositors is at risk should a bank fail. The only way to eliminate this risk would be for banks to maintain capital equal to 100 percent of risky assets plus contingent liabilities, or for the FDIC to insure all deposits. Mingo (1985) argues that capital regulation will increase rather than reduce the risk of bank illiquidity. If an institution falls below the regulatory capital guidelines because of a one-time loss, then the public may believe the bank is undercapitalized and will be subject to regulatory action or perhaps even failure. The result could be a run on the bank by uninsured depositors. Mingo further points out that this risk is independent of the capital standard set by the regulators; it could as easily happen if the standard were 8.5 percent of assets as if it were 5.5 percent.
Mingo's concern should be addressed in the development of capital adequacy standards but it does not necessarily preclude establishment of numerical capital guidelines. The guidelines are intended to create a buffer for losses without resulting in bank failure. To undercut the risk of illiquidity occasioned by a bank run, the agencies could announce that unanticipated losses occasionally will push some banks below the guidelines. In such cases, banks whose capital remains above some other target (for example, whose capital is equal to zero percent of assets) will be subject to special regulatory attention but will not be closed. 19
Drawbacks to Regulating Capital
Capital regulation can impose a variety of costs on society. For example, while increased capital may protect the banking system by reducing the risk of bank failure, it also shields mismanaged firms. As A. Dale Tussing (1967) points out, banks are disproportionately important to the development of their communities because they control the allocation of credit. Therefore, protecting banks from failure can impose costs as well as provide benefits.
Another potential disadvantage of regulating capital is that it may render banks less competitive by raising their cost of funds. The FDIC deposit insurance guarantee lowers the price banks must pay to attract deposits. Furthermore, the cost of uninsured debt is generally less than that of equity, judging from at least some theoretical models of capital structure. 20 Two dangers of reducing banks' competitive position are that it could lessen the efficiency of the financial system as well as the proportion of the money supply deposited at banks. A weakened competitive position implies that banks will forgo some share of the market for various financial services. Such a loss may be desirable to the extent that banks' current share is attributable to a deposit insurance subsidy. But where banks' market share owes to their greater efficiency, the loss they suffer ultimately may exact a toll from socrety, which may be deprived of the efficient competitor.
The market for transaction accounts, where most of the money supply resides, are of special concern because of society's strong interest in protecting the money supply. Currently the safety of transaction accounts at most depositories is assured both by deposit insurance and the institutions' ability to borrow through the Federal Reserve discount window. 21 If insured institutions were to lose a substantial share of the transactions account market, then the government's ability to protect the money supply could be undermined. Thus, capital regulation designed to protect the safety of banks and other insured depositories would be counterproductive if it substantially reduced the depositories' share of the market for transactions accounts.
Two additional disadvantages could arise if banks offset capital regulation by undertaking additional risks. First, the FDIC's losses actually could grow if banks increase their risks by more than they expand their capital. Furthermore, even if banks seek to offset the increased capital only partly, they may inadvertently take on more risks than they intended. The second problem is that as banks attempt to raise their return on equity, they may invest in risky projects that could not otherwise receive funding Society might find it less costly to allow banks to exploit deposit insurance through inadequate capital than through high-risk investments.
Alternatives to Capital Regulation
Neither of the principal potential advantagesthe reduced risk of a banking system collapse and increased protection of the FDIC-is necessarily unique to higher equity capital ratios. Thus, before we adopt capital regulation as a solution to these problems, we should examine the alternatives.
Protecting the Banking System. The banking system is vulnerable to collapse because of its dependence on depositor confidence. Increased equity capital can enhance depositors' confidence in the long-run stability of their banks, thus reducing the risk of deposit runs. However, increasing equity capital is not sufficient to maintain depositor confidence, for depositors remain exposed to some risk. Nor is capital regulation necessary for promoting depositor confidence. The government can lower the risk of deposit runs through deposit insurance, which serves as a substitute for equity capital by curtailing the risk borne by depositors. The FDIC has effectively prevented bank runs from spreading since its creation in 1933. Benjamin M. Friedman and Peter Formuzis (1975) suggest that insurance is such a potent substitute that it virtually eliminates depositors' incentive to demand higher capital ratios.
An alternative to extending FDIC insurance is to rely on the Federal Reserve as the protective "lender of last resort." In this role the Federal Reserve can ensure that the banking system does not collapse by providing liquidity so that banks can meet depositor demands for withdrawals. Eventually, as depositors see that their banks are not going to fail due to illiquidity, they stop withdrawing deposits. 22 One problem is that relying on the Federal Reserve may permit occasional bank runs when depositors temporarily lose confidence in some institutions.
Protecting the FDIC In addition to protecting society, increased equity capital could reduce the losses to uninsured creditors and the FDIC when banks do fail. Capital regulation may not be appropriate protection for uninsured creditors, who should be able to demand adequate compensation for the risks they take without government help. Capital regulation may be desirable, however, if it reduces losses experienced by the FDIC.
The FDIC generally requires that a troubled bank's losses be borne first by its stockholders and subordinated debtholders before the agency contributes to protect depositors. Losses shouldered by the FDIC should be paid out of banks' accumulated insurance premiums, but if losses exceed the insurance fund the agency would turn to Congress and the Treasury for support. 23 The FDIC must insist that banks maintain positive economic net worth (the market value of assets less market value of liabilities) if it wishes to prevent banks from operating with negative net worth. As the experience of many savings and loans demonstrates, the market will not necessarily close federally insured depositories even if their economic net worth turns negative. 24 Additional equity capital may be required to give the FDIC time to identify problem banks and to absorb substantial losses should an institution FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis fail. However, if the FDIC could close banks before their economic net worth turns negative or if it required banks to issue a substantial amount of uninsured, subordinated debt, the agency would have less need for equity capital regulation. The FDIC could even choose to absorb the greater losses that might result from weaker capital standards, but require that banks pay sufficiently higher premiums to cover the expected rise in losses.
Closing Banks. The FDIC would face several problems if it relied solely on closing banks before their economic net worth turned negative. First, failure currently is defined in terms of accounting net worth rather than economic net worth. Banks can show positive book value even when their economic net worth is negative, because they are not required to recognize changes in the market values of their assets and liabilities in their accounting records. 25 Thus, under present procedures the FDIC would be exposed to substantial losses even if it held complete control over the timing of bank closings. Moreover, managements of banks with positive book value but negative net economic worth realize that unless they can increase their earnings by more than their deficit, they face future closure as the economic losses are recognized in the accounting records. This provides a strong incentive to take on assets with high returns even if they also carry high risks. If the assets are good, the bank may continue in operation; if not, the bank management sacrifices nothing since it was headed for failure anyway. The real loser when a bank invests in high risk/high return assets is the FDIC, which must absorb significantly greater losses if the assets prove to be bad.
A possible solution to the net worth problem is to use market values rather than values based on the current generally accepted accounting principles. 26 One difficulty, though, is that the market value of a bank's assets depends partly on whether they are assessed at liquidation value or at their value to the bank if it is a going concern. In the latter case, the assets' value generally exceeds their liquidation value. Recognizingthis problem, George G. Kaufman (1985) suggests that large failed banks be run by the FDIC rather than liquidated.
Another obstacle to this approach is that the market value of an asset or liability sometimes is hard to determine. While the effect of interest rate changes can be measured using discounted cash flow techniques, establishing the change in value due to changes in credit risk is much more difficult. 27 Edward J. Kane (1985) recommends that the FDlCs liquidation division arrange periodic auctions of assets as a way of providing some measure of value for assets hard to estimate. Such auctions would not eliminate the problem of valuing assets but might help set reasonable parameters for the process. A further drawback of market value accounting is that the FDIC may find it politically difficult to force banksto reduce the value of some assets even though the agency and the banks know they are overvalued.
Problems with obtaining the market value of many assets and liabilities almost guarantee that their estimated value will differ from their true economic value. Estimated values need not be perfect, however, to represent an improvement over current practice. To the extent that market value accounting yields better estimates of economic net worth than does current accounting practices, this approach may help the FDIC to protect itself better.
A second reason the FDIC might be unable to shield itself from losses is that a bank's value may be subject to discontinuous drops. 28 In theory, the FDIC need not suffer losses if a bank's value drops at a continuous rate. Suppose, however, that a bank loses a substantial portion of its asset value because of management fraud or a sudden change in the market value of its assets. The FDIC would not have ample time to defend itself against such a sudden drop even if it closed banks as soon as it knew their economic net worth had plunged to zero.
The questionable cost-effectiveness of monitoring all banks closely enough to recognize those whose net worth is turning negative is a related problem. Bank examinations are costly to 14 NOVEMBER 1985, ECONOMIC REVIEW both the government and the banks. The costs of capital regulation must be weighed against those of bank examination to determine the minimum amount of capital required to protect the FDIC.
If the FDIC could close banks before their economic net worth turned negative, then the agency might protect itself from losses even when banks held virtually no equity capital. To justify capital regulation on the grounds of safeguarding the FDIC implies that the agency often is unable to close banks before their economic value turns negative. The problems in using accounting values rather than economic values and in measuring the latter accurately, the risk of discontinuous drops in asset values, and the costs of bank examination all make it difficult for the FDIC to avoid losses. These impediments suggest that some minimal level of capital regulation might be appropriate to give the FDIC time to identify problem banks.
Subordinated Debt
Aside from its role in affording the FDIC time to recognize problems, capital also might be required to absorb substantial losses should a bank fail. If capital guidelines are to be set sufficiently high to protect the FDIC, should the regulations apply to equity capital alone or to the sum of equity capital and subordinated debt? Since subordinated debtholders absorb losses only when a firm is bankrupt, the principal advantage of regulating only equity capital is that banks can charge losses to their capital account without failing. The effectiveness of equity capital in preventing bank failures may be important in reducing FDIC losses if, as Stanley C. Silverberg (1985) suggests, the value of a big institution drops when the market believes it is going to fail.
An advantage to regulating the sum of equity capital plus subordinated debt is that it may reduce regulatory costs by allowing banks to issue subordinated debt rather than equity if debt is less expensive. Furthermore, buyers of subordinated debt wish to invest in low-risk institutions while equity buyers may prefer to invest in riskier banks if expected returns also are higher. Thus, banks that issue subordinated debt are less likely to try to work around capital regulation by taking higher risks.
Insurance Premiums. The argument that the FDIC might reduce its losses through capital regulation does not necessarily imply that such regulation is the best way to protect the fund. An alternative would be for the agency to substitute higher insurance premiums in return forallowing lower capital standards. A potential advantage is that banks might find higher premiums less costly than higher capital standards. The current fixed-rate deposit insurance structure could accommodate such premiums, or they could be part of a risk-rated premium system. 29
Summary
The theoretical case against relying on the market to control bank equity capital positions is strong. Market determined capital ratios tend to ignore the impact of one bank's failure on other banks. Additionally, it seems clear that banks will exploit the protection offered by deposit insurance to reduce their capital ratios. The importance of both these effects is less clear. Since its creation in the 1930s, FDIC deposit insurance has acted as a potent substitute for bank capital in maintaining depositor confidence: not one bank failure has sparked runs at other banks. Evidence to indicate that the risk of deposit runs would be reduced substantially by capital regulation is sparse Furthermore, the quantitative effect of insurance on bank capital ratios has yet to be established. 30 The theoretical case against using equity capital regulation to correct for market failure is strong as well, but it too, lacks crucial empirical evidence. The primary arguments against such regulation are that the market-rather than the regulatorscontrols bank capital ratios; that regulation would be ineffective in reducing bank risk exposure; that regulation has significant disadvantages; and that better alternatives exist.
The contention that the market controls bank capital ratios is the least persuasive. Some studies from the period prior to capital guidelines indeed suggest that the market controlled banking organizations' capital; however, evidence from the current policy regime points to the regulators' effectiveness in requiring specified capital levels.
While equity capital has a statistically significant effect on a bank's risk of failure, the benefits of increased capital may be offset by an increase in the riskiness of bank assets and off-balance sheet activities. The theoretical evidence is clear that some banks will respond to capital regulation FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA by assuming additional risk, yet the empirical support for this hypothesis is weak.
The empirical evidence on capital regulation's effect on bank competitiveness and on resource allocation is also weak. However, theoretical evidence implies that capital regulation reduces banks' ability to compete with nonbanking organizations and that it might result in a misallocation of society's resources.
If increased equity capital reduces banks' risk of insolvency, it also could reduce their risk of illiquidity by increasing depositor confidence. However, increased equity capital is neither necessary nor sufficient for preventing bank failures due to illiquidity. The FDIC has effectively shrunk the risk of deposit runs and the danger could be eliminated if the agency provided 100 percent deposit insurance. Alternatively, the Federal Reserve could prevent banks from failing due to illiquidity by acting as a lender of last resort.
Capital regulation could lessen FDIC losses by providing a cushion to absorb losses. Potential substitutes for shielding the FDIC include closing banks before they exhaust their economic net worth, requiring banks to issue additional subordinated debt, and raising FDIC premiums. However, these measures may be inadequate to protect the FDIC fully. The experience of economically failed savings and loans shows the market will not necessarily close bankrupt institutions that are federally insured. This suggests that some minimal equity capital standards may help reduce FDIC losses. NOTES 1 Ben S. Bernake (1983) argues that the collapse of the banking system led to a sharp reduction in bank loans to small business and that this caused a sharper drop in economic activity. Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963) suggest that the collapse of the banking system led to a steep decline in the money supply, which both deepened and prolonged the Depression. 2 Banks must maintain depositor confidence if they are to remain liquid since a large portion of bank deposits can be withdrawn with little or no notice should depositors lose faith. A significant portion of bank assets are invested in longer term loans which cannot be liquidated on short notice. 3 See Karlyn Mitchell (1984) for a discussion of why capital ratios have fallen. 4 The issues in regulating the capital of banks owned by holding companies are reviewed by Larry D. . 5 The current regulatory guidelines and some of their effects on banks are discussed by R. Alton Gilbert Courtenay C. Stone, and Michael E Trebing (1985) . 6 See David C. Cates (1985a) for a discussion of some of the issues in determining the adequacy of the loan loss allowance John J. Mingo (1985) argues against reducing primary capital by intangibles The case for increasing required levels of subordinated debt is given by Paul M. Horvitz (1984) and Larry D. Wall (1984) . Stanley C. Silverberg (1985) discusses the issues involved in requiring banks to meet a nine percent capital to assets ratio where capital is defined to include subordinated debt 'The proposition that there is no optimal capital ratio was first developed for corporations in general by Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller (1958) . " See Stewart C. Myers (1984) 9 See George J. Benston (1983) for a further discussion of banks' vulnerability '°See also John J. Pringle (1974) for a discussion of the influence of maturity structure of liabilities on bank capital. 11 Among the theoretical studies that have examined this issue are Orgler and Taggart (1983) , Stephen A Buser, Andrew H. Chen, and Edward J. Kane (1981) , John H. Kareken and Neil Wallace(1978) , William F. Sharpe (1978) , and Robert A Taggart, Jr. and Stuart I. Greenbaum (1978) . "Reliance on retained earnings for increased capital is one element of the pecking order theory of capital structure discussed by Myers (1984) . 13 Santomero (1983) points out that the reliability of their estimates depends on the nature of the process generating changes in bank capital. If the stochastic processchanges over time, then the estimates of risk or failure must also change. "•See also Robert A Eisenbeis (1980) . 15 See Yehuda Kahane (1977) , Michael Koehn and Anthony M. Santomero (1980) , and Chun H. Lam and Andrew H. Chen (1985) for theoretical models of the effect of capital regulation on a bank's asset portfolio allocation. ,6 For example, see Eamonn Fingleton (1985) . "Not all off-balance sheet activities increase bank risk; some activities can be risk reducing. For example, interest rate options can be used to hedge mismatches in the maturity structure of bank assets and liabilities '"Benjamin M. Friedman and Peter Formuzis(1975) suggest that increased bank capital will provide little additional protection to depositors. ' 9 The agencies may choose to close banks with inadequate but non-zero capital if they place a higher priority on protecting the FDIC than on preventing bank failures See the discussion below on the use of capital standards to protect the FDIC fund. "See Myers (1984) . ''Among the uninsured alternatives to bank transactions accounts are accounts offered by money market mutual funds Most money market funds already allow check withdrawals (although they often require that checks at least equal some minimum amount) and the potential exists for them to expand their share of transactions accounts if banks become sufficiently uncompetitive. "See Thomas M. Humphrey and Robert E. Keleher(1984) for a historical perspective on the role of a lender of last resort "Generally, though, the resources of the FDIC would not be expected to suffice for loss coverage from extraordinarily adverse economic conditions caused by bad macroeconomic policies or unanticipated exogenous shocks to the economy. "See Edward J. Kane (1982) for a discussion of the role of deposit insurance in maintaining failed thrifts " Kane (1982) discusses the ability of savings and loans to remain in business in spite of very substantial declines in the market value of their mortgage portfolio due to increases in interest rates He points out that savings and loans like banks need not recognize declines in market values and that public confidence in the institutions is maintained by FSLIC insurance. 26 Both Kane (1985) and George G. Kaufman (1985) have recently advocated this "One of the biggest problems in applying discounted cash flow techniques would be determining the effective maturity of some types of assets and deposits or valuing the options with which they are associated 28 The effect of a discontinuous change in bank operations is developed by Thomas Ho and Anthony Saunders (1981) (1985). "See Chapters 2 (prepared by Laurie Goodman), 3 and 4 of Sherman J.
Maisefs Risk and Capital Adequacy in Commercial Banks. 36 Guttentag and Herring (1984) Most observers agree that changes in the rate of monetary growth can have potent short-term effects on real economic activity. 1 This impact is felt even though money is neutral with respect to real activity in the long run. That is, over a prolonged period monetary actions affect the price level and not real economic activity in an economy expanding at its long-term potential.
Control of the money supply is important to policymakers, not as an end in itself, but because changes in the money supply are associated with subsequent changes in spending and real economic activity. Theory suggests that fluctuations in output and employment (the business cycle) can be counterbalanced by timely changes in the growth rate of the money supply. When the money supply is manipulated in this way, it is an intermediate target of monetary policy. Milton Friedman acknowledges "persuasive theoretical grounds for desiring to vary the rate of growth of the money stock to offset other factors." 2 The stabilizing potential of money supply changes makes a case for discretionary monetary policy. As a result, the length and variability of the lag, or the time that elapses before the economy responds to monetary policy, has emerged as an important question for economists and policymakers alike. We will examine the evidence relating to the lag between one intermediate target Ml
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The lag before an economic stabilization policy takes effect has been debated intensely for the last 30 years. Although the issue pertains both to monetary and fiscal policy, monetary policy's lagged effect has received most of the attention since Milton Friedman addressed the problem (1953 , 1961 and Friedman and Schwartz, 1963 . Research and debate focus not only on the exact length of the delay between introduction of a change in the rate of monetary growth and its initial impact on nominal gross national product (GNP), but also on the time required for a monetary impulse to attain its maximum effect and eventually, to be dissipated completely. Extensive research over the last three decades offers various, and often conflicting, estimates of this lag's duration, ranging from one quarter to several years. The variability of the lag is an object of study, as well. This entire body of research has failed to produce unambiguous conclusions regarding the length of these lags and their stability over time. The lack of consensus is important because it is associated with related disagreements over the proper scope of monetary policy.
Variability and excessive length of lags complicate policymaking in different ways. If the goal is to achieve a given level of GNP growth, then lag variability could complicate the proper timing of monetary actions, even if the policy response is appropriate in every other way. A desirable action may be "wrong" if it affects the economy at a different time than anticipated. Thus, an accurate forecast of the economy's condition at the time the policy effects will occur is crucial for gauging the proper policy action, particularly when long lags are involved. The further into the future a forecast is made, the greater its uncertainty; consequently, errors are more likely.
Assumptions and Lag Classifications
For this discussion, we will assume that the Federal Reserve as monetary authority, has effective control of the money supply, which we use to represent monetary policy. Where possible, we will employ the narrowly defined monetary aggregate, Ml; when the evidence uses M2 (M1 plus time deposits, MMDAs, MMMFs, and overnight Eurodollar balances) or reserves, this is noted. 3 A lag may occur between the time a policy action is taken and the money supply responds. This is part of the"inside" lag, typically defined as the time required to recognize and respond to economic conditions requiring policy action, plus the time required to affect the chosen growth rate of the intermediate target. The "outside" lag measures the time between the change in that target and the response of the ultimate objectives: output, employment, and prices. 4 The outside lag concerns us here. 5 Also important in the study of policy lags is the distinction between initial and cumulative lags. The initial, (or impact) lag is the time between the policy change and its first measurable impact on nominal GNP. The cumulative lag is the time between a policy change and the final measurable response in GNP.
The Timing of Monetary Influence: Reviewing the Evidence
A huge body of research addresses the channels of monetary influence and may provide some insight into the timing of lagged policy impacts. The research we surveyed attempts to answer such questions as the following: How many months or quarters after the initial change in monetary growth will we first observe a response in GNP? How long before we observe the maximum effect? What is the time pattern? Before Friedman's work focused attention on lag length and variability, few formal empirical studies had analyzed this question. The many estimates made since then fall into several groups. First is work based on the reference cycle method that Friedman used. Second is reduced-form (often single equation), econometric models that concentrate on the relationship between overall economic activity (GNP) and policy variables. The third group is based on structural models. These are large econometric models, composed of many equations, sometimes hundreds, specifying the relationship among GNP, financial market variables (primarily interest rates, but also monetary aggregates), nonfinancial markets, and international trade.
Reference-Cycle Turning Point Analysis. Employing reference-cycle analysis, Milton Friedman's work revived interest in the potency of monetary policy and stimulated much subsequent research into policy lags. 
Hypothetical and Policy I
The economy's adjustment to changes in monetary growth is not a discrete, all-at-once event but takes place as a distributed lag. The effects of a monetary policy action tend to begin gradually, build to a peak, and then subside Thus past monetary growth continues to influence GNP long after the monetary growth actually occurs An increase in the rate of monetary growth temporarily stimulates real economic activity. Once such resources as labor and capital are fully employed, or once inflation becomes generally anticipated, monetary growth produces a permanent increase in the price level. While this description of the transmission mechanism is extremely simplified it suffices for an examination of timing issues
To understand what lags in the effect of monetary policy imply, let us look at a hypothetical lag structure. To simplify the example, we will assume that the pattern of monetary influence can be represented by a single, nonstochastic equation. 6 Let us also assume that GNP is growing along a trend path, and that the only dislocations from the path are caused by monetary policy.
Consider an expression for percentage changes in GNP away from trend as a function of past growth in the money supply. 7 This does not represent any of the specific lag structures we will survey later, although its shape conforms to the classic response profile found in many studies of monetary policy lags 8
This equation reads that the percentage change (% A) in real GNP in the current period, (t) is determined by the percentage change in monetary growth in the previous four periods (t-1, t-2, t-3, t-4). The contribution of each period's monetary growth to current GNP growth is determined by the lag weights (0.3, 0.5,0.4,0.2), which are the coefficients of the %A M t variables According to our model, a one period increase in monetary growth of, say, 1 percent, will produce an increase in GNP growth of .3 percent the following period, .5 percent two periods later, .4 percent three periods later, and .2 percent four periods later.
This example, an extreme simplification of even the most basic lag structures shows that monetary policy's influence on real GNP exhausts itself afterfour periods Many studies point to much longer lags a different pattern of lags (lag weights that decline monotonically, Lag Pattern for instance), or lag weights that turn negative. (In the long run the lag weights must turn negative and sum to zero if money is neutral.) Also, our example does not specify the length of a "period;" the f s could represent quarters or years
To set the stage for studying the impact of a change in monetary growth, assume that monetary growth (% AM) has held steady at 5 percent for a long time. This level of growth implies that nominal GNP has been growing at7 percent The economy, fully adjusted to the 5 percent monetary growth, is said to be in equilibrium. Assume now that monetary growth is raised to 10 percent (%A M t = 10). Despite this doubling of monetary growth, GNP growth will remain at 7 percent during period t That is it will not appear to respond to the doubling of monetary growth. This follows from the fact that the impact on GNP is "in the pipeline" but not immediately evident Not until the next period, when the quickened monetary growth "comes on line" does GNP growth begin to rise above 5 percent If the 10 percent monetary growth is sustained, GNP growth will continue to increase until it stabilizes at 14 percent in the fourth period after the initial acceleration of monetary growth. Now consider the consequences of a decrease in monetary growth to the original 5 percent level. How long will it take to bring GNP growth back to 7 percent? In the period when monetary growth is reduced, GNP does not reponsed visibly to the decline. In the next period, t+1, monetary growth decreases and in the subsequent periods GNP growth approaches the original 7 percent level consistent with long-run monetary growth of 5 percent Only after four full periods following the decrease in monetary growth does GNP growth return to its original pace.
The simplified example used here assumes away many of the problems that complicate real-life monetary policy decisions First the example treats only one influence on GNP, monetary growth, when in reality a multitude of influences-some predictable; others random-impinge upon it Second we assume the monetary authority can achieve the desired growth rate for money immediately, when we know that actual money growth also depends on consumers' and businesses' choices about currency holding and the banking system's choices about deposit expansion. Third, the lags are assumed to be known as well as stable. Together, these Friedman (1953 , and Friedman and Schwartz, 1963a compared the time between business cycle turning points and the preceding turning point in monetary growth from 1867 through 1960. That span covered 18 complete business cycles. Omitting war years, he demon: strated that the peaks in money supply led (reference cycle) peaks in GNP by an average of 16 months. For troughs, the average lead time was 12 months. The peak-to-peak lag varied from six to 29 months. It was these findings that supported Friedman's widely publicized assertion that the lags are long and variable.
Friedman contended that the lag between a turning point in the rate of monetary growth and the economy's response was so longand variable that the intended countercyclical effects of discretionary monetary policy often occurred when they were neither intended nor appropriate. "In terms of past experience," Friedman wrote, "action 22 NOVEMBER 1985 assumptions create optimal conditions for carrying out monetary policy; yet even this best case implies severe constraints on achieving desired GNP growth quickly. Consider another experiment Suppose monetary growth were reduced to 1 percent long enough to trim GNP growth to 1.4 percent Four full periods are required after monetary growth is increased to 5 percent to return to the original 7 percent path of GNP growth. This lengthy delay suggests another tactic
The monetary authority could return GNP growth to the 7 percent path rapidly if it "played" the lags by initially increasing monetary growth above 5 percent. If the authorities raised monetary growth to 19.6 percent GNP growth would return to 7 percent in one period. However, if the authorities wanted to maintain this 7 percent GNP growth they would need to offset the higher, 19.6 percent level of monetary growth by mandating decreases in the next period. In fact keeping GNP on the 7 percent track would entail considerable oscillation in period-to-period monetary growth. The length and weight of the lag values determines the exact pattern of oscillation. This relationship helps illustrate another point: if the monetary authority cannot predict the variability in lag impacts, oscillation is almost a certainty.
The preceding example demonstrates that lags in the impact of monetary policy make it impossible to achieve GNP goals immediately without variability in monetary growth. At any given time, observed GNP growth exhibits evidence of earlier changes in money growth. Knowledge of the lag structure is necessary for judging the probable short-run reponse of GNP to current policy. When forecasting GNP, policymakers must consider the pattern of monetary growth over as many previous periods as it takes for monetary influence to be dissipated completely. For example, a four-period history must be considered in the instance above. Estimates of monetary lags suggest that actual lags may be quite a bit longer, and so a more protracted, more complicated history must always be kept in mind.
Our example illustrates some of the policy complications that attend even a very simple lag structure. The survey of the evidence makes it clear that even such considerations are minor in comparison to the complex patterns of policy effects taken now to offset the current recession may affect economic activity in six months or not for a year and six months." 9 Earlier he had concluded: "The difficulty is that, in practice, we do not know when to vary the growth rate of the money stock and by how much.... therefore, deviations from the simple money growth rule have been destabilizing rather than the reverse." 10 Friedman's research was criticized on a number of points. For example, cycle turning point analysis does not distinguish among different rates ol monetary expansion nor between short-lived and sustained changes in the rate of monetary growth. 11 Moreover, early criticisms emphasized that the level of economic activity (GNP) was inappropriately linked to the rate of change of the money supply. 12 The most frequent criticism was that the lag should not be measured by the time between the change in money growth and the cycle turning point, but between the change
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 23
Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis in money and the initial response of incomethat is, when the monetary influence displaced income from what it would have been.
One of the first published responses to Friedman's findings came from J. M. Culbertson (1960 Culbertson ( , 1961 , who not only took issue with the "long and variable" finding (he argued that"substantial effects" occur within six months or less) but disagreed with its policy implications as well. 13 Even though Friedman's work was criticized widely, his finding that lags are long and variable and his conclusion thatthis implies limited scope for countercyclical monetary policy have shown considerable staying power for several reasons.
First, once researchers addressed the major criticisms of Friedman's work, some still found long and variable lags. More importantly, the lack of consensus on the length and variability of monetary policy lags as well as the lack of standardization hampering intermodel comparisons have lent passive support to Friedman's assertions.
Using a reference cycle methodology similar to Friedman's, Beryl Sprinkel (1959) compared changes in the growth rate of the money stock with business cycle peaks and troughs for 1909-1959. The money supply data were measured in a variety of ways, to yield statistical series that were both sensitive to recent changes in monetary growth and smooth enough to reflect turning points. Sprinkel's results resembled Friedman's,
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with the average lag for recoveries being 8.6 months and for recessions 19.9 months, with a variability of up to 29 months. The "long and <* variable" conclusion was reinforced.
Clark Warburton (1971) , reporting results of a case-by-case cycle history over the period 1919-1965 found great variability in lag lengths. He attributed this to a steadily changing economy, to the different stages in the business cycle at which policy was applied, and especially to the economy's continual adjustment to past monetary disturbances. No statistical method of controlling for these influences was suggested. Warburton's analysis of cyclical history as a whole was not optimistic about the possibility of developing such methods. Thus, his findings suggest that variability is the norm and that any conclusions based on summaries and averaging offer scant meaning for the study of policy lags.
In a study of monetary growth around cyclical peaks, William Poole (1975) measured the magnitude of monetary decelerations by the growth of the money stock relative to an established trend. He was considering the necessary and , sufficient conditions for a cyclical peak, using cyclical peaks from 1908 to 1972, and 24-month trend monetary growth. The results show that monetary growth decelerations typically lead cycle peaks by about six months.
Generally, the application of reference cycle methods to the study of monetary policy lags yields estimates that suggest the lags are indeed long and variable. Consequently, such analysis is understandably pessimistic about the probable success of countercyclical monetary policy.
Other (Non-Model) Based Methods. Using a nonparametric approach, Gene C. Uselton (1974) demonstrated that in the ten-year period from 1952 to 1961 the average lag in the effect of changes in monetary growth on changes in industrial production was seven months or less. The lag proved to be the same for contractionary and expansionary policies. The effect was shown to peak at seven months, after which the additional stimulus from policy declined rapidly. Uselton _ found the lagto be highly reliable but distributed over several periods of up to 10 months. 14 M. Ray Perryman (1980) In a direct response to the reference cycle approach, specifically to Friedman (1953) , John Kareken and Robert M. Solow (1963) analyzed the timing of the outside lags by economic sector, concentrating on investment The authors provided no estimate of the total lag implied by the various sectoral lags. While Kareken and Solow asserted that considerable stabilizing power occurs after six months, their results also imply a substantially longer total lag.
Other researchers continued to use the sectoral approach to lag estimation. Thomas Mayer's (1966) attempt to correct and complete Kareken and SoloWs estimates of component lags identified eight sectors of the economy which accounted for almost three-quarters of all domestic investment, plus consumer credit Mayer then combined the eight sectors to yield a weighted lag he treated as an estimate of the complete lag between a change in credit availability and its effect on national income. His findings implythat the outside lag is quite long-on the order of 1 7 months-and critically dependenton the degree to which the economy had adjusted to previous monetary policy changes. After adjusting several of Mayers response estimates, William H. White (1961) found that the policy lags were much shorter, approximately 12 months or less.
In contrast to the reference cycle research, the nonparametric approaches of Uselton and Perryman indicate shorter and more reliable lags. (Note that the sample periods they consider cover a much shorter history than does the reference cycle work. 15 ) Although the sectoral approach initially claimed to disprove Friedman's "long and variable" finding, the lag suggested by these findings is in fact quite long.
Economic Models. Complete structural models of the economy can track the path by which changes in monetary policy influence the economy. Still, they are not designed specifically to examine the money-lag sequence. in contrast to structural models "reducedform" models express key economic variables, such as GNP or inflation, as direct functions of policy and other outside (exogenous) variables. Supporters of the reduced-form approach contend that, if users of statistical models are concerned principally with explaining and forecasting the behavior of only a few primary economic variables, it is unnecessary to derive estimates for all the variables of a structural model. Besides, they argue, our economy's complexity eludes even the most ambitious structural model. 16 Accordingly, they contend that it may be preferable to isolate and examine only the relationship between the "driving" variables, representing monetary and fiscal policy, and the policies and the variables ultimately affected by them, such as output or inflation. In general, reducedform models look for a net effect rather than the process of economic adjustment.
Reduced-form models, such as the St. Louis model, are more likely to show an immediate impact of money on output (and extensive lags in the cumulative effect). For this reason, economists who believe in a strong causal response of GNP to monetary growth favor reduced-form models. Structural models used to assess the impact tend to show a weaker causal relationship.
Most research conducted explicitly to examine lags in monetary policy's effect has involved designing and testing reduced-form models. Consequently, considerably more evidence can be culled from such models.
Reduced-Form Models. Leonall C Anderson and Jerry L Jordan (1968), in a seminal exposition of the St. Louis model, constructed a reduced form model to measure GNP's response to two measures of monetary policy (the money stock and the monetary base) and to several measures of fiscal policy between 1952 and 1968. One goal was to gauge the speed with which monetary policy affects GNP. They found relatively short lags and strong effects attributable to monetary actions. 17 Their work showed that the impact effect (the marginal contribution of money to nominal GNP in each period) reached its maximum in two quarters, and that the total effect (the cumulative impact of policy up to a given point) peaked within one year-evidence at odds with the "long and variable" finding.
Another response to Friedman's work showed that even if the economy's actual response to monetary policy was quick and highly predictable, the reference cycle turning point technique would yield estimated lags that were indeed long and variable. Donald P. Tucker (1966) , J. Ernest Tanner (1969) , and Paul E. Smith (1972) were less concerned with actually measuring the lags than with constructing plausible reduced-form models of the economy's response to monetary FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA policy, models consistent with specific channels of monetary influence. They demonstrated that the timing of the response is extremely sensitive to the magnitude and duration of a monetary expansion or contraction. This research did not disprove that the lag was long and variable. It showed that reference cycle analysis could point to long and variable lags even if, in fact, the lags were neither.
A number of empirical studies have shown that aggregate investment responds only gradually, over a long period, to changes in interest rates. 18 Some have inferred that monetary policy may be constrained by these interest rate lags and thus may work too slowly to be useful for stabilization purposes. According to Tucker (1966) , the investment responds to interest rate changes with a long distributed lag, but other components of aggregate demand (namely consumption) respond more quickly. The model Tucker developed is theoretical. However, simulations using some "reasonable" U.S. economic data yielded estimates of an extremely short initial lag: one quarter. While the cumulative lag is quite extended, the simulations suggested that income could adjust to within 10 percent of its equilibrium level within two quarters.
TuckeKs work was extended by Tanner (1969) and Smith (1972) who considered the interest rate responses implied by Tucket's results to be unrealistically rapid but found other features of the model valuable. Tanner, using data from 1947 to 1967, estimated a two-sector model that explicitly accounted for the interrelation between goods markets and financial markets. The effect of monetary policy on CNP was estimated to peak in three to six months. Combined with the assumption that accurate economic forecasts can predict further than six months into the future, both TanneKs and Smith's work suggests that discretionary monetary policy can be used for economic stabilization. 19 In a paper updating the original St. Louis model, Leonall C. Anderson and Denis Karnosky (1972) found "sharp and substantial positive response of real output growth for five quarters following a permanent change in the rate of increase of money" from 1955 to 1971, 20 "Growth of output then ceases to accelerate and falls rapidly while the rate of price increase rises moderately." 21 They also noted that "the adjustment of output, while zero in the long run, is extremely volatile compared to the adjustment pattern of prices.... The length of the adjustment period for both prices and output to a monetary shock was found to be almost 24 quarters." 22 These specific findings conflict with the long and variable results of some other researchers. Yet Anderson and Karnosky showed that in simulations using various types of money shocks and different stages of adjustment to prior shocks (using equations that indicate a consistent and precise response of output and prices), variable lags could result. Thus, they suggested that variability is to be expected.
Similar results reported by J. R. Moroney and J. M. Mason (1971) revealed consumption spending responding to policy adjustments long before investment. They showed that consumption is affected initially during the quarter when monetary policy (as proxied by the monetary base) is changed, while investment spending does not begin to respond until two quarters later. Overall, they concluded, the influence of a change in monetary growth peaks in roughly three quarters, and the total impact appears to last 15 quarters.
With asmall model using unanticipated monetary growth as the policy variable, Rose McElhatton (1981) studied how output and inflation respond to monetary policy. 23 She concluded that output's initial response is small in the first quarter and rises steadily for seven quarters to a peak; the total effect is complete in about 10 years.
While these results are not unusual, the implications for countercyclical policy are discouraging because of the severe constraints associated with designing policy around unanticipated monetary growth. 24 Clearly, some divergence exists in estimates of policy lags. None of the estimates is particularly robust with respect to different estimation periods and estimation techniques. However, only Tanner (1979) and Thomas F. Cargill and Robert A Meyer (1978) have explicitly examined systematic variability of the lag. They questioned whether past estimates that implicitly or explicitly assumed that the lags did not change over time may have been biased. They also asked whether and why the lags might change systematically through the years.
Cargill and Meyer examined the stability of income's response to changes in monetary policy by employing two small econometric models of the U.S. economy. Each of these models embodies fairly different ideas of policy effectiveness and channels of monetary influence. Using data from the period 1953-1973, the authors found that the economy's structure and hence the response time to policy changes is more appropriately modeled by using time varying techniques-that is, techniques that yield not one unchanging estimate representing response, but an estimate for each period. Both models were estimated using the constant coefficient as well as time varying coefficient techniques. The results indicate that while the classic response profile of a fairly short initial lag and long cumulative lag is typical for the constant coefficient estimations and the time varying estimations of both models, the response has varied considerably over the years. Additionally, the timing of income's response to changes in monetary growth (that is, lag pattern and lag length) is influenced profoundly by stage of the business cycle at which the policy change occurred.
Unfortunately, the results can not be generalized easily because Cargill and Meyer report estimates only for four selected time points-two each of tight and easy monetary policy. However, the results provide several insights and whet our appetite for a closer examination of the cyclical history of the selected time points. First, the empirical findings show that the cumulative response of income to a unit change in monetary growth declined unevenly between 1960. and 1972, but the impact lag was shorter and the initial response constituted a greater proportion of the total response in those later years.
About the same time Cargill and MeyeKs research was published, Tanner (1979) examined the variability issue while also considering causes for possible systematic change in the lags from 1953 to 1974. This approach allowed for variation due to different stages of the business cycle, the posture of monetary policy (relative ease or restraint), and the trend in the dynamic relationship between policy changes and GNP. Initially, the estimates were made without separately specifying all three influences. These first results indicated that over the entire period the initial impact lag is about one quarter, while the time required for income to exhibit its maximum response to monetary change is between three and four quarters. There is considerable variation through the years however, as revealed by analysis of several separate periods. In contrast to the Cargill and Meyer results, Tanner 7 s estimates showed a substantial lengthening of the lag from the 1950s to the 1960s. When Tanner accounted for the array of varying economic conditions, though, rather different results emerged. First, the cumulative lag appears to grow longer over time. Tanner explains that this result illustrates the dominance of the trend toward somewhat tighter monetary policy overthe entire period. At the same time, however, this lengthening tends to obscure his finding that loose policy is associated with a shortening of the lag, a result interesting to those studying more recent monetary history. Tanners overall findings are pessimistic for the scope of countercyclical monetary policy: the lag is found to vary in a systematic way depending on the stance of monetary policy over time, but does not appear to be predictable from episode to episode, over the business cycle.
The general profile of lags that emerges from reduced-form models is that of fairly short (two quarters or less) impact lags, and fairly long cumulative lags. Monetary policy appears to have its greatest total impact on nominal GNP within the first two years after implementation; its influence dissipates precipitously thereafter. While this generalization is quite broad, it is robust across a variety of models and time periods.
Structural Models. Even though most structural models have not been designed explicitly to examine the timing question, policy simulations on the models can extract some information FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis about timing. Because structural models ordinarily use nonborrowed reserves as the exogenous monetary policy variable and reduced-form models use the money supply, comparability problems immediately emerge. Nonborrowed reserves often are considered "more" exogenous than money; that is, they are better controlled by the monetary authority. Thus, the problem of possible two-way causation between money and economic activity may be addressed more effectively in structural models using nonborrowed reserves. However, the difficulty in isolating an appropriately exogenous monetary variable to study lags is compounded by the fact that the controversy is not over the reserves-moneyincome sequence but the money-income timing pattern. Any conclusions about the latter based on the former must assert a reliable timing relationship between money and reserves.
Early explorations of policy effects in structural models (for example, Ta-Chung Lui [1963] ) were done by exogenizing interest rates, which made it impossible to examine the money-CNP timing issue. Later, however, results of experiments using reserves or money were published. Michael K. Evans (1966) described a quarterly model of the U. S. economy that pointed to an impact lag of about three quarters; policy evokes no income response for six months. The marginal impact peaks at the end of year one and virtually, disappears by the end of the sixth year. Evans' work is notable for explaining how the uniqueness of multipliers, and thus lag patterns, varies inversely with the degree of nonlinearity in the models being compared. This characteristic should be remembered when comparing all model results.
In response to Anderson and Jordan, R. C. Davis (1969) examined the MPS model for sensitivity to monetary policy changes. This structural model was one of the first to specify a highly developed financial sector. Davis found that not only was there no impact on GNP in the quarter in which monetary policy (measured by changes in nonborrowed reserves) was changed, but that even after four quarters the effect was small.
About the same time, Frank de Leeuw and Edward M. Gramlich (1969) also reported on the MPS model simulations, concentrating on the channels by which monetary and financial forces affect nominal GNP. Their results indicate some influence in the first quarter after policy is changed. The effect increases to reach its maximum in about 2 1/2 years. They concluded that the largest single impact occurs in the third and fourth quarters, then falls off steeply so that, by the end of the fourth year, the policy change's effect is virtually limited to higher prices. That study also demonstrated that the economy's initial condition greatly influenced the timing of effects.
George G. Kaufman and Robert D. Laurent (1970) simulated monetary policy on a version of the same model. Like de Leeuw and Gramlich, they imposed an injection of $1 billion of nonborrowed reserves into the money supply. The response was slower than found by Anderson and Jordan, but not as slow as other structural model results. By the end of the first year, GNP had reached about one third of its total response; by the end of the second year, 72 percent of its total.
The maddening problems of comparing the various types of models was addressed by Gary Fromm and Lawrence R. Klein (1975) . Although the quarterly response of income to the monetary policy variable is not available, a summary of results from the DRI (1974) version, St. Louis, MPS, and Wharton Mark III models was provided. Except for MPS, the large structural models typically showed the initial lags to be two to three quarters, with the impact cresting in about 2 1/2 years. The St. Louis model exhibited lags similar to previously reported experiments; however, those of the MPS model were shorter than lags reported by de Leeuw and Gramlich. Considering the timing of monetary policy effects, Laurence H. Meyer and Robert H. Rasche (1980) summarized the consensus across models rather pessimistically. They summarized policy simulations of five models, both reduced-form and structural, and used different estimations of several models. According to their results, the impact lag averages two to three quarters, while the maximum effect of policy occurs in about three years. Meyer and Rasche report a secular rise in monetary policy multipliers and an attendant shortening of the impact lag from the 1960s to the mid-1970s.
Experiments using structural models show a somewhat longer impact lag and more extensive cumulative lag in the effect of monetary policy than do reduced-form models. Interestingly, results for structural models suggest a trend toward shorter lags and greater monetary policy impacts from the early 1960s to the later 1970s. Whether this is attributable to the increased detail in specification of the models' financial sectors, which would imply that earlier lag estimates were biased, or to a secular shortening of the lag, is unclear. One result common to both types of model is the classic response profile: a reasonably short initial lag, a peakingof influence within two to five years, and a long tailing off over several more years.
Little consensus exists on the exact profile of money lags in structural models. Nonetheless, the extensive research results do not contradict an assertion made over 20 years ago: "the full results of monetary policy changes on the flow of expenditures may be a long time coming... but some (initial) effect comes reasonably quickly and builds up over time so that some substantial stabilizing power results and remains after a lapse of time. . .and then dissipates." 25 Rational Expectations. A new approach to business cycle analysis, emphasizing the importance of expectations, began to dominate the study of monetary policy effects in the mid-1970s. Since then few studies have directly addressed the issue of monetary policy lags. The controversy over policy effectiveness and its appropriate scope and timing took a new direction with the publication of a series of papers that established the rational expectations literature. 26 This research has profound implications for the study of lags in the effect of countercyclical policy.
Rational expectations applies the principle of rational, optimizing behavior-which economists have always assumed in the microeconomic setting-to the acquisition and use of information in the macroeconomic setting where stabilization policy analysis is conducted. Together with the assumption of efficient markets, rational expectations forms the core of the new classical macroeconomics. This approach asserts that any attempt to stabilize real activity in the short run is ineffective; that is, it claims for the short run a neutrality previously applied only to the long run. Minimally, the new classical macroeconomics implies that even if variations in monetary growth have some effect on real output a systematic policy designed in such a setting would be untenable. Additionally, the lag coefficients would change, perhaps unpredictably, with every change in policy. Moreover, if policy is neutral in its effects then the study of lags is pointless, for rather than real consequences, only price effects would result from policy changes. This reasoning dominated the theoretical discussion of policy for several years and stimulated considerable research into its likely empirical implications.
In the last four or five years critics of the neutrality proposition have shown that, in the presence of "market imperfections," short-run non-neutrality of money is consistent with an economy characterized by rational expectations. These imperfections are formal and informal institutional structures including overlapping multi-year labor contracts, other arrangements that limit price flexibility, investment that requires time to build, and particular inventory strategies. 27 Certainly, these studies have dismissed the initial assertions of policy ineffectiveness. The institutional structures they associate with non-neutrality suggest that countercyclical policy may be feasible, even in a rational expectations setting. Consequently, lags continue to be an important concern for policymakers.
Recent Estimates. Recent estimates of lags are quite short For example, Milton Friedman (1984) now maintains that money changes initially affect output after only six months. In other words, the highest correlation of monetary growth and nominal GN P growth occurs when the latter is lagged two quarters. Friedman also concludes that variability FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis is considerably less than projected earlier, only about three to nine months. 28 He associates both the shortened length of the lag and the decrease in variability from late 1979 to late 1982 to the unusually large fluctuations in monetary growth over that period. "The effect," as he puts it, "was to errhance the importance of the monetary changes relative to the numerous other factors affecting nominal income and thereby speed up and render more consistent the reaction." 29 Results reported by Robert J. Gordon (1981 Gordon ( , 1983 tend to corrobate this view. Comparing of cyclical peaks in the real money stock with subsequent peaks in coincident economic indicators, Cordon reports an average lag of only three quarters, with a range over five post-World War II cycles of six to 12 quarters.
Policy Implications
What stands out from these results is that while some consensus exists on the overall pattern of lags in the effect of monetary policy, estimates of the lags' exact length and variability from cycle to cycle differ considerably. The purpose of research on lags is to determine how they constrain the effectiveness of monetary policy. Can monetary policy stabilize GNP growth, or is it so hamstrung by longand variable lags that 30 V 1 policy actions designed to stabilize the economy may actually exacerbate the business cycle? Any conclusions about the significance of lags for y. policy must confront both the differences in results across the literature and the implications of the classic response profile, which is generally ^ common to nearly all the studies surveyed.
Lack of Consensus. The lack of consensus regarding details of the lag pattern can be attributed in part to problems of intermodel comparisons orto possible systematic changes in lagsoverthe ~t history surveyed.
Intermodel Comparisons.Clearly, the lack of standardization hampers intermodel compari-* sons. 30 Indeed, many "established" economic relationships do not stand up under varying specifications. 31 The largely mathematical differences between structural and reduced-form models do not necessarily involve different assumptions about the way the world works. Nevertheless, a spirited debate has developed over the relative merits of each for policy evaluation. Because the model types have become associated with particular • views of policy effectiveness, the debate remains vigorous. At the base of different assessments of monetary policy's role are disagreements about y the channels through which monetary variables operate. Thus, models usually are specified by researchers with strong prior beliefs about the variety and importance of the channels of monetary influence. Even among models of a given type, especially nonlinear models, estimates of lag structures vary with the initial conditions of the estimation period. 32 Such conditions include the stage of the business cycle over which the model is estimated or forecast. Additionally, the specification of the policy instrument affects lag estimates. In nonlinear models, the magnitude of the policy 4 change influences measured lags as well. Finally, NOVEMBER 1985, ECONOMIC REVIEW Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis the study of lags frequently has been hostage to the monetary versus fiscal policy debate. That controversy has been waged, to a great extent, through discussion of cumulative policy multipliers which yields little information on timing.
Systematic
Changes in Lags over Time. The lack of consensus on lags may, of course, reflect changes in the lags over time. Some theories suggest that the lags vary systematically with changes in money demand that are associated with the degree to which financial markets are deregulated, the interest sensitivity of the demand for money, the extent to which monetary policy actions are anticipated, and the amount of international currency substitution. 33 The 1970s and 1980s may provide empirical evidence to test these theories: these decades have witnessed accelerated innovation and deregulation of financial markets, historically high inflation, the development of cash management techniques that help businesses (and households) react to actual and expected policy changes, and an increase in international capital integration.
A stable relationship may underlie the timing of the response of economic activity to monetary impulses, yet the relationship's complexity renders it difficult or impossible to specify completely. None of the models reviewed has attempted to account entirely for different cycle phases, initial conditions, policy instruments, and previous monetary history, let alone deal with problems of intermodel comparisons. Also, while some theoretical models suggest a relationship between, for example, the interest elasticity of money demand and the timing effects of policy, no empirical studies have explored possible changes in the lags during or between periods of shifting money demand. 34 In the late 1970s and 1980s, economists paid considerable attention to respecifying formerly reliable money demand equations (which had begun to break down in the mid to late 1970s). Research suggested that when interest rates reached new highs, the interest elasticity of money demand increased. 35 Theoretical work has shown that heightened interest sensitivity is associated with a smaller initial impact of money stock disturbances and a lengthening of the economy's adjustment to money supply changes. 36 In light of interest rate history, this finding suggests that lags should have lengthened over that period; however, the latest evidence shows they did not (Friedman, [1984] and Cordon, [1981] ). But without a model that specifies the other possible systematic influences on lags, it is impossible to sort out their relative contributions.
The timing debate is no closer to resolution than before researchers launched the many investigations surveyed here. Even so, we have learned several things. First the "long" part of "long and variable" refers to the cumulative lag, not the impact lag. Because the impact lag is fairly short, some stabilizing countercyclical policy effect can occur relatively quickly. Second, the term "variable" does not necessarily imply the predominance of random influences on lags. Now, let us consider the meaning of the one finding that is fairly consistent with different specifications and initial conditions.
Implications of the Classic Response Profile.
The classic response profile of GNP to changes in monetary policy imposes some constraints on policymakers, and implies that policy actions always carry some risk. The presence of lags means that policy-makers must recognize the likely and continuing effects of past decisions on current and future economic conditions as well as the consequences of current initiatives on future economic developments. This is not easy, as it involves both a moving target (the everchanging economy) and a tool with delayed effects.
At any point, the real output effects of past policy can be having an impact on employment, while the price-level effects of even earlier policy may be influencing prices. Unless policy has been relatively steady over several years, these effects may be "whipsawing" the economy. For instance, we could experience high inflation at the same time we see rising unemployment if a strong expansionary policy, allowed to become overly stimulative, were followed by a severe monetary contraction. At such a juncture, policymakers would face the unappealing choice of raising monetary growth to fight unemployment during a period of inflation or lowering it to counter inflationary pressures duringa recession. While policy can be changed quickly, the chain of events consequentto policyactions cannot be reversed. Since past policies cannot be neutralized by subsequent countervailing strategies, policymakers cannot start with a clean slate every time a decision is necessary. Unfortunately, the policymaker does not have the luxury of declaring a new set of initial conditions each time FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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The response of the economy to monetary expansion or contraction clearly is not random, but the timing of the consequences is indeed problematic The research surveyed shows a disappointing lack of consistency in measuring the time lags from monetary impulses to changes in real GNP and inflation. These results indicate substantial differences of opinion on timing. The meaningful results are rather imprecise and the precise results are easily challenged. Therefore, monetary authorities need to conduct policy with an awareness of the lags and a skepticism regarding any specific claims about their duration. Policymaking always proceeds a risky environment.
NOTES
'The short run refers to a period over one or more complete business cycles, shorter than the period required for output and prices to adjust completely to changes in monetary growth. The term is analytic, not technical, and may refer to different lengths of times in different settings 2 Milton Friedman (1960) , p98. 3 There is a separate controversy concerning the appropriate monetary aggregate for measuring policy actions. This controversy was not particularly intense before the accelerated financial innovation and deregulation that began in the late 1970s "In this paper, output GNP, and income are used interchangeably, to refer to the level of overall economic activity on a national basis 5 For a taxonomy of the different lags, see Willes (1965) and Kareken and Solow (1963) . 6 Nonstochastic implies no uncertainty about the economic relationship involved. A stochastic equation includes a term representing influences that are unforeseen, although there may be some probability of their occurring 'The following representation and interpretation follows from Mason (1976 Culbertson (1960) , Kareken and Solow (1963) . 12 See, for example, Warburton (1971) , especially p 121. ' 3 Culbertson (1960) , p 621. ' 4 Uselton (1974) , p. 113. ' 5 Uselton (1974 ) covers 1952 -1961 and Perryman (1980 ) covers 1953 , while Sprinkel(1959 and Warburton (1971) each consider sample periods over 40 years long. The Friedman and Friedman and Schwartz works contain cycle history covering over 90 years '"This is especially true if structural is defined as invariant with respect to policy changes " Anderson and Jordan (1968) , p. 22. 18 See, for example, Kareken and Solow (1963) . ' 9 The proposition that the shorter the lags from money to output are, the greater the scope for countercyclical monetary policy has been challenged by Howrey (1969) . Later however, Fischer and Cooper (1978) confirmed part of Friedman's conclusions In a theoretical work, they showed how variability in lags could well bring discretionary monetary policy to grief. On the other hand, long lags were shown to require more activist monetary policy. Alternatively, Higgins(1982) discusses conditions under which lags in the effect of policy are not an impediment to attaining policy objectives. 20 Anderson and Karnosky (1972), p. 160. 21 Ibid., p 164. "Ibid, p 161. "Unanticipated money is defined as that part of actual monetary growth that is generally anticipated, and, thus can be expected to be offset or neutralized, before any real effects occur. For a fuller explanation of this concept, see Robert J. Barro "Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment in the United States," American Economic Review, vol. 67 (1977) 220 (1978) . "Ironically, these are the same lags claimed by Culbertson in an early reply to Friedman's long and variable finding. Friedman criticized Culbertson's 'casual' empiricism. See Friedman (1961) , and Culbertson (1960) and (1961) . "Friedman (May 1984), p. 399. 30 Fromm and Klein (1975) Fromm and Klein (1975) , Rasche(1980), and Hanna (1975) . "See Jack Vernon, "Money Demand Interest Elasticity and Monetary Policy Effectiveness," Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 3 (1977) , pp 179-90, as well asTucker (1966), Smith(1972) , Tanner(1979) Intense economic challenges, both in the domestic and foreign arenas, are taxing the U.S. textile industry's adaptability. The resourcefulness and flexibility of domestic textile firms may determine whether they will benefit from anticipated growth in the world textiles markets Recent economic developments have affected the U.S. textile and apparel industry's workers, employment production location, equipment, and markets. One widely publicized factor in the industr/s problems was the dollars rise in value against foreign currencies, which lowered prices of imported goods and raised prices of domestic exports. Other influential forces included the increase in domestic labor costs relative to those in most competing countries; high real interest rates that increased the capital spending needed to modernize domestic manufacturing plants and thus reduce labor requirements; an expectation that domestic market growth would remain sluggish while world markets expand; and duty assessments that encouraged U.S. manufacturers to transfer labor-intensive operations abroad and employ low-cost foreign workers. These economic forces are transforming the U.S. textile and apparel industry just as earlier forces shifted In the early 1900s, the textile industry began moving southward in search of reduced labor costs and less intense union activity. Although by 1950 textile employment was already larger in the southern states than in the North, employment trends from 1950 to 1970 clearly illustrate the industr/s shift to the Southeast, as nearly 60 percent of all textile jobs in the Northeast's six major textile-producing states disappeared (see Table 1 ). Massachusetts was especially hard-hit, losing over 70 percent of its textile employment, or 85,000 jobs. In contrast North Carolina, which grew into the leading textileproducing state, picked up 50,000 textile jobs from 1950 to 1970 and accounted for the bulk of the increase in the Southeast.
Today, the southeastern region accounts for over 70 percent of all employment in the nation's weaving, yarn and thread, and carpet mills (see Table 2 ). Employment in southeastern knitting mills and finishing plants accounts for about half of the national total. In the apparel FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA 1970 1980 1985 1970 1980 1985 
Shrinking Employment
But textile employment in the Southeast has changed direction again during the past decade, in a way that could reshape southeastern employ ment. Since 1980 more than 60,000 industry jobs have been lost in North Carolina and South Carolina, the two leading textile states. Combined with the apparel industry, textiles firms employ more people than any other industry in Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and the Carolinas. Even so, the industry's dominance has been shrinking in the Southeast Since 1970, textile employment as a share of total nonfarm employment has slipped in every major southeastern textile-producing state (see Table 3 ). For the region, textile employment's share fell by more than half from 1970 to 1985, now accounting for just 3.3 percent of all nonfarm employment The apparel sector registered a less severe decline but had shrunk to 2.7 percent of regional nonfarm employment by 1985. In absolute terms, the region's textile employment contracted by 155,000 workers or by 25 percent, from 1970 to 1985. AppareJ employment grew by 31,000 workers, or by 8.7 percent, from 1970 to 1985; but the industry lost 16,200 jobs, or4 percent, from 1980 to 1985. By contrast, total nonfarm employment grew by over 27 percent during the same 1 5 year period.
Shifting Employment Sectors
With its 206,000 textile workers, North Carolina remains the industry's largest employer despite recent cutbacks. For the first half of 1985, the state's unemployment rates have hovered around the 5 to 6 percent range, suggesting that the economy is rapidly absorbing displaced mill workers. Notwithstanding North Carolina's loss of 16,500 textile jobs and 4,500 apparel jobs from June, 1984 to June, 1985 , the number of unemployed workers actually fell by nearly 21,000 over that period. In South Carolina, where unemployment rates also rank below the national average, the pattern is similar 10,400 textile jobs and 3,600 apparel jobs were lost statewide over the year, while the total number of unemployed workers dipped by nearly 7,000. Over the same period each of the two states posted gains in construction and service employment totaling about 32,000 and a lift in trade employment of above 22,000. The pattern is similar for the other regional states except Alabama as burgeoning employment increases in the trade, construction, and services sectors more than offset negative figures registered by apparel and textile firms (see Table 4 ).
The bankers we contacted in small towns where a large mill closed said that many former textile employees have been offered jobs in other plants owned by the same company. They added that other former mill workers found employment near their hometowns.
Unlike auto or steel workers, low-wage textile workers seldom lose much income when they shift to another job. Their communities, however, are likely to suffer. Textile mills usually are located in or near small towns where alternate employment opportunities are limited. Low-skilled workers often must seek new jobs in larger metropolitan areas. Since most of the displaced workers have to move elsewhere to find work, it compounds the mill community's economic loss through a drop in business activity. It is little comfort to a community that such an outmigration often removes people from its public assistance rolls. 2 Former managerial employees in particular can have difficulty locating new jobs nearby, sometimes being forced to relocate. Production- oriented firms appear more likely to hire lower level employees because such workers are relatively low-paid and seem to adapt more readily to new jobs than do managers whose different policies can cause conflicts.
36

Employment
Certain characteristics of textile and apparel workers set them apart from the typical manufacturing employee (see Table 5 ). Women who FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis One favorable trend for onshore manufacturing, however, has been the reduced proportion of production workers in the textile and apparel industries. In 1975, managers, professionals, and technical workers constituted only 11 percent of the textile work force and 8 percent of apparel workers. In 1985 the numbers rose to 15 percent and 12 percent, respectively, reflecting rapid change in the makeup of the mills' work force. Concurrently with that reshaping of the payroll, automated equipment has been replacing human operators. Automation obviously reduces labor costs, but it complicates managerial responsibilities and may increase the risk of loss. As capital investment per employee increases, equipment downtime becomes more costly. Operators must monitor machines more closely, for an error can shut down an entire production line Demand for textile school graduates, therefore, increasingly intensifies as companies bring more sophisticated equipment into their plants. 3 
Changes in the Mill
Diverse technological changes are taking place in the textile/apparel industry. Changes include the installation of faster, more efficient machines, advanced auxiliary equipment for machine cleaning or materials handling, and computers for data processing and finishing. 4 In some cases a new plant must be constructed to integrate the whole process, since in older mills work typically was passed through several rooms located on different floors. New mills have only one floor, with machines arranged to minimize the potentially significant costs of moving materials from one operation to the next.
Production methods have improved significantly over the last decade with the introduction of high technology, such as robotics and computeraided design and manufacturing. Manufacturers have made large capital expenditures in modern machinery to enhance productivity and competitiveness. Textile and apparel industries increased their capital outlays more than 28 percent last year to $1.78 billion, following a small 4.2 percent rise in 1983. Outlays were constant at a lower level in 1981 and 1982. 5 By the end of the current decade, according to some, estimates,
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NOVEMBER 1985, ECONOMIC REVIEW Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis mills may require one-third fewer workers than they did in the 1970s. 6 Although improved technology has increased productivity in the U.S. apparel industry, the improvement has not closed the price gap sufficiently between domestic and foreign producers. Apparel manufacturing still involves many manual operations. The sewing room remains highly labor intensive, with most employee time spent positioning and handling piece goods. The typical single-needle shirt produced in the United States still requires 14 to 16 minutes of direct labor. The industr/s traditional structure of a large number of small producers limits the use of capitalintensive production methods because of inadequate capital. Limitations have forced firms to respond to import competition by turning to offshore facilities while reducing the output of domestic plants. A high proportion of apparel is now produced in low-wage countries either by American-owned plants or American-selected contractors.
U.S. firms also are using offshore processing under Item 807 of the U.S. tariff code to increase competitiveness. This stipulation permits domestically cut material to be shipped for sewing to countries with lower labor costs, then reimported. Duty is paid only on the value-added portion of the commodity, and that value is modest because of the low-cost foreign labor used in the sewing operation. Some companies are cutting back their own domestic production and are concentrating on marketing apparel purchased from others. Therefore, marketing has taken on added significance in recent years.
Demise of Domestic Firms
As a whole, the textile industry is "mature" in that its domestic growth potential is limited. From 1972 to 1983, mill shipments advanced at a compound annual rate of only 0.3 percent, expressed in 1972 dollars. During that span, many mills stopped serving markets that offered little or no potential for growth. Although the domestic textile industry has become highly efficient and productive, particularly in labor productivity, cost factors regarding labor and government regulation and outside economic forces are requiring changes. For example, the expectation that the dollar's value will remain high and that foreign labor costs will remain lower than U.S. costs has encouraged some domestic companies to shift production abroad or to purchase fabrics from foreign suppliers. These same forces are discouraging U.S. exporters from competing in foreign markets. The relatively high value of the dollar makes foreign goods cheaper, since during the past five years the dollar has exchanged for an ever-growing volume of foreign currency. The dollars strength correlates closely with fabric exports and imports. The attrition of the U.S. apparel industry is due partly to its highly competitive environment and the abundance of small firms. Recent surges in import competition have depressed profit margins and hastened the departure of firms with scant financial reserves and limited means to adopt cost-reducing or market-enhancing technology. Changes of season and style necessitate adjustments in production that can be especially risky for small firms. I n addition, just as firms may enter the industry easily when conditions are good, they may exit rapidly during periods of strong competitive pressure.
Low labor costs have been the key to foreign firms' effective penetration of U.S. markets.Domestic retailers find they can capture larger profit margins by purchasing low-cost foreign goods rather than the typically more expensive domestic goods. This is especially true in price-sensitive lines and staple items. In recent years, wages in major Far East exporting countries have increased more rapidly than in the United States, but the 
Market Problems
Major foreign suppliers of textiles and apparel to U.S. markets are Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, China, and Japan, all of which have signed bilateral trade agreements with this country. Imports from these countries continue growing, along with rising imports from several European nations such as the United Kingdom and Italy, and others not covered by quotas (see Table 7 ).
In contrast with the typically large foreign firms, domestic firms historically have been small, family-owned businesses with managers more production-oriented than marketing-oriented. 10 The dispersion among independent companies of separate steps in the manufacturing process has tended to keep all but the largest vertically integrated mills from direct contact with the market. U.S. producers often focus on the domestic market because of its size and the enhanced costs and risks of exporting. This is especially significant because per capita domestic consumption is expected to grow only 1 percent annually. Most foreign firms, on the other hand, must concentrate on exports because of their small domestic markets. Foreign producers frequently rely on the expertise of international trading companies for assistance in establishing contacts, securing financing, and identifying market opportunities.
Typical of the more aggressive foreign producers is South Korea's textile/apparel industry, a world leader that operates primarily as an export industry-earning about one-third of that country's foreign exchange. 11 The industry (in contrast to most domestic producers) is virtually self-sufficient, being vertically structured from petrochemical production through apparel manufacturing. Taiwan and Hong Kong also owe a large share of their foreign exchange earnings to the textile industry. China reportedly unhampered by environmental standards for clean air and water, has a competitive advantage in manufacturing cotton textiles and apparel. The country's cotton complex (from growing cotton to producing Table 8 . Imported products from cotton weaving mills increased by over 75 percent from 1983 to 1984, and imported men's and boys' suits and coats grew by more than one-third over the period.
Slow Growth Ahead
The long-term outlook for the textile/apparel industry is for slow growth. Textile employment levels may continue to contract, as automated equipment is substituted for low-skilled workers. Well-financed companies will hurry to adopt new technology to increase productivity. More mergers are likely, since concentration will provide finances to modernize equipment and form more innovative management and marketing teams. Workers necessarily will become more skilled to operate increasingly sophisticated equipment, and, as a result, wages eventually will compare more favorably with other manufacturing sectors. Professional and technical workers will comprise a greater share of the textile workforce. At the same time, larger companies also are likely to turn to offshore production fora greater share of product mix, contributing to shrinking domestic textile job rolls.
Over the longer term, if the dollar reaches more favorable exchange rates against foreign currencies, the United States may be able to sell more of its products in export markets around the world. Mány emerging nations will require more textiles for their own populations; the domestic industry's export potential could expand significantly. Yet organizations that lack the resources to improve manufacturing productivity and marketing may find themselves unable to compete. Many small, inflexible firms fit this category. Without major changes they are likely to face extinction over the longer term. Thus, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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